From empire to Atlantic 'system': the Round Table, Chatham House and the emergence of a new paradigm in Anglo-American relations

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The aim of the article is to investigate the ideological and material influence by the Round Table Movement on the origins of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, in the definition of a new paradigm in Anglo-American relations. The entrance of the United States into the forefront of world power politics had permanently changed the world's balance of power, which now required a direct and perpetual association of the United States in the maintenance of the world's economic and political stability. But in the United States there did not then exist the subjective conditions for their association to the direction of world politics. The interwar historical role played by the Round Table was to steer the transition from an Anglo-French to an Anglo-American dyarchy in the management of world power.

Keywords: Anglo-American partnership; Lionel Curtis; the Round Table Movement; Chatham House; Council on Foreign Relations

1. The Round Table and post-First World War imperial relations

The First World War brought about a profound transformation of the Round Table's strategy and political philosophy. Veneration for Lord Milner prevented the leaders of the Movement – Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis – from fully understanding the game in which they had been skilfully encapsulated – for the fierce anti-German campaign carried out by the magazine of the movement, and *The Times*, which fell under their control, between 1910 and 1914 – until the end of the Great War. Kerr, the most intelligent and sensitive member of the group, brought by Milner himself to become the closest collaborator of Lloyd George, was the first to become aware of Milner's manipulating skills: Kerr developed during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference a sense of guilt towards Germany, which inspired the *Memorandum of Fontainebleau* and the subsequent policy of appeasement.[1]

The negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference persuaded Kerr and Curtis that the British Empire, even a reformed Empire, was no longer able to guarantee, by itself, international stability. The war had given the Dominions a fundamental strategic role in the achievement of victory, and the Peace Conference had disrupted the diplomatic unity of the Empire by giving each Dominion an independent representation at the negotiations table. During the war, the Dominions were divided by conscription controversies, and on the battlefield they developed a sense of national identity. At the end of the war, the main argument for Imperial cohesion – the German threat –

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had disappeared, and a sense of international détente – centred on the League of Nations – strengthened centrifugal forces. With the recognition of the principle of equal partnership between the Dominions and Great Britain, the development of independent military and diplomatic apparatuses, and the questions of Irish and Indian independence, Anglo–Dominion relationships had changed forever. Kerr was the first Round Tabler to realise that the war had both revealed and accelerated the historic decline of the Empire everywhere, as well as the emergence of a new and more dynamic insular power, one which would inevitably oust the old. The peace of Versailles undoubtedly signalled the transition from a European to a world system of States, with Germany at the centre of the international power struggle.[2]

The study of the Round Table brings us in fact to the central question of the first half of the Twentieth century, the Anglo-German rivalry, as a major cause of two world wars because of the weakness of the British Empire. If in the Nineteenth century after the end of the Napoleonic Wars Britain was successful, from an isolationist position, at preventing the spread of the various European wars of regional character into a general conflict, during the Twentieth century Great Britain twice failed in the task, losing her insularity in continental alliances. She prevailed over Germany only thanks to the intervention of the Dominions, India, and her 13 former colonies on the other side of the Atlantic.[3]

The centre of gravity of world power had already shifted from the Channel to the Atlantic – reflecting on the political scale a process which on the economic and financial scales had already manifested itself since the beginning of the Twentieth century. The entrance of the United States into the forefront of world power politics had permanently changed the world's balance of power, which now required a direct and perpetual association of the United States in the maintenance of the world's economic and political stability. But in the United States there did not then exist the subjective conditions for their association to the direction of world politics. Kerr and Curtis felt that they had to prepare the transition from an Anglo-French to an Anglo-American dyarchy in the management of world power. The Anglo-French dyarchy, which had constituted the centre of gravity of international relations since the Italian and German unifications, appeared no longer able to guarantee a peaceful revision of the *status-quo* established by the treaties, and thus to prevent a regional conflict from spreading worldwide.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Round Table could rely upon *The New Republic*, a journal founded in 1914 by Willard and Dorothy Straight – an American couple active in progressive circles – which played a significant role in supporting the entry of the United States into the European conflict. Straight shared with Kerr a total endorsement of Admiral Alfred Mahan's strategic doctrine on sea power, considering the survival of the Royal Navy of fundamental importance for American security, and persuaded an initially reluctant Lippmann, editor of the journal, to openly support the case for American belligerency. From early 1915 Lippmann advocated American policies favouring the Allies, a fair peace settlement, and the definitive abandonment of American isolationism. The United States were, according to Lippmann, an integral part of an 'Atlantic community,' and American war aims should have been for 'a union of liberal peoples pledged to cooperate in the settlement of all outstanding questions, sworn to turn against aggressor, determined to erect a larger and more modern system of international law upon a federation of the world.'[4]

If Wilson was the exponent of American support for a theoretical liberal world order based on respect for international law and morality, Theodore Roosevelt was the leading exponent of an 'Atlantic system', 'heightened,' according to Priscilla Roberts, 'for many patrician Americans,' and aimed at maintaining 'social and political dominance over the tide of non-Protestant immigrants from southern and eastern Europe,' and to force the newcomers 'to accept old-stock values and norms.' Before 1914, however, supporters of a more active and direct involvement of the United States in European affairs were, among the Republicans, limited to Theodore Roosevelt's entourage, represented by John Hay, Elihu Root – to become President of the Council on Foreign Relations – Henry Cabot Lodge, Henry L. Stimson, Frederic R. Coudert, George W. Wickerham, and Admiral Alfred T. Mahan.[5]

Among the Democrats the most prominent Atlanticists were, from 1914, Colonel Edward M. House, Robert A. Lansing – Wilson's Secretary of State – Walter Page – American Ambassador in London – Franklin D. Roosevelt – Assistant Secretary to the Navy – Norman Davis – Assistant Secretary to the Treasury – Frank L. Polk – Assistant Secretary of State – and John W. Davis, the Solicitor General. Within Wall Street, J.P Morgan and Company played a leading role in raising substantial financial assistance to the Allies before American intervention. J.P. Morgan Jr., Henry P. Davison, Thomas W. Lamont, Dwight W. Morrow, Willard Straight, Russell C. Leffingwell, and Benjamin Strong – the first Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York – had in Cliveden, the Buckinghamshire country house of the Astors, a venue for social entertainment and conferences with Round Tablers during their frequent business trips to England. Davis, Polk, and Paul D. Cravath of the Treasury and State Departments were also able to benefit from the Astors' hospitality.[6]

The Round Table's revised strategic goal thus envisaged a re-establishment in the Twentieth century, with American support, of the political and economic conditions of the Nineteenth, during which, after Trafalgar, Great Britain gained an unchallenged world hegemony both militarily (with the Royal Navy), in the economic and financial system (with the sterling gold standard and the centrality of the City of London), and at the political level (with the joint action of the Foreign Office and intelligence). This supremacy, which is known as *Pax Britannica*, lasted almost a century, and gave the world the longest period of truce in history after the fall of the Roman Empire, a period which saw – according to the Round Table – the most spectacular jump of Western civilisation in all its forms, particularly in the field of scientific and technological discoveries, but also in ever growing standards of quality of life.

During the Peace Conference, Kerr, as Private Secretary to Lloyd George, contributed to drawing up a framework for peace which reflected the factors which had most contributed to victory. 'The underlying idea at Paris in 1919,' Kerr was to say in his Burge Memorial Lecture sixteen years later,

> was that the United States, France, and the British Empire should collectively discharge through the League of Nations, which gave representation to all peoples, the ultimate stabilizing function which Great Britain alone had performed in the preceding century and in an even more liberal way,

since 'what preserved the peace of the world during the Nineteenth century and ended the long series of world wars of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries was the

complete naval supremacy of Britain after Trafalgar.' In an era of air navigation and of technological and scientific discoveries which had tended to increasingly reduce the size of the world, Great Britain would be able to continue with her historic role of maintaining the balance of world power only in close collaboration with the United States.[7]

Before it became manifest that the United States would withdraw their weight from the centre of international power politics, Kerr and Curtis became fully aware that the process towards the disintegration of the Empire was irreversible, and that the Round Table had already entered a period of crisis which was to prove irreversible. The unprecedented boost given by the war to Dominion nationalism, and the recognition of their full sovereignty in the membership to the League of Nations, had completely destroyed any hope for a federal union of the Empire. The Dominions groups started to warn the London inner circle that people were 'shying off Imperial Federation,' and that it would prove 'disastrous' to try to push from Britain a campaign in that direction. 'A new catechism' was required, and Curtis was left in the sole company of Malcolm in supporting the case that 'the more unacceptable the doctrine, the greater … is the need for the preacher.' To insist on something which had obviously became anachronistic would have meant 'marking time.'[8]

If in Canada the whole organisation was 'on the verge of collapse,' in South Africa, where the movement had never been strong, there was 'little chance of it becoming so now that the war was over.' In India, the few groups founded by Curtis collapsed as soon as the members of the Indian Civil Service were forbidden to join. The situation seemed better in Australia, but there was no 'wide-flung group system,' and in New Zealand, a member of the Wellington branch could not offer a better picture of the difficulties which the movement was facing in the Dominions:

> Since Curtis's departure, there has been little demand for the *Problem of the Commonwealth* or the *Commonwealth of Nations* and the attitude of the public, like that of many of the members of the groups, has been of apathy. The result is that those who are believers in a federal system are handicapped in their efforts to do propaganda work as they are scattered, find it difficult to communicate with each other, and in some of the groups are regarded as impractical idealists or else too logical for human nature's daily food. There is too much of a tendency to regard the Round Table members as a politician considering what course or compromise he can induce the House or his constituents to accept rather than as a missionary whose duty it is to discover and point out the truth no matter how unpopular or unpalatable it may be at the moment.[9]

Having accepted the fact that in the post-war world 'the British Empire has ceased to exist,' the Round Table then progressively shifted their interests from Imperial to international questions. It was in Paris, during the most critical period of the peace negotiations, that the members of the Round Table present there decided to reverse the order of their priorities. A letter of Curtis to Kerr of 1936 offers us an extremely valuable insight into this fundamental turning point in the history of the Round Table organisation:

> When Union [in South Africa] was achieved, more rapidly than even we had hoped, we felt that it was up to us to apply the same process to Imperial relations, especially in view of the German menace. The Round Table Groups and the magazine were the result … In the course of the war, the Dominions as well as the British Government seized on men

trained in the Round Table Groups to help them with Imperial relations and Foreign Affairs, with the result that a large number of us found ourselves together at the Conference at Paris in 1919. Our years of Round Table experience had taught us the supreme importance of genuine research; but it had also taught us that genuine research is hampered in so far as it was connected with any element of propaganda. The Round Table, founded by people who believed intensely in the British Empire, necessarily suffered from this limitation. We, therefore, set out to establish a separate organ of research in which people of all differences of opinion, however great, could unite; an organ debarred from all propaganda. All this was settled in Paris in 1919. When in 1920 the work of creating and organising the projected institute was taken in hand it was Abe [Bailey] who stepped forward with a cheque which enabled a room to be hired, and stationary and stamps to be paid for, so that invitations could be sent out to some hundreds of people representing all parties to join the new institute. It was later on that Abe gave the institute permanence by giving it a perpetual endowment of £5000 a year. Apropos of the above, the time is gone when we need to be afraid of admitting … that Chatham House was the outcome of Round Table work. I have always lived in hope that a day would come when my Round Table colleagues would acknowledge their child and drop the habit of imputing its sole parentage to me.[10]

According to Curtis, the major architect of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and for many years the great wire-puller, the persistent operator behind the scenes, 'the foundation of Chatham House was a necessary tactical change to effect the same strategic object.' When in 1919 Curtis realised 'the unforeseen limits of the Round Table organisation which represented our tactics,' he put forward a scheme to achieve the revised objectives of the Round Table: the strengthening of Imperial and Anglo-American relations, through the creation of an 'institutionalized' foreign policy élite, in spite of the fact that Anglo-American relations in 1919–20 were characterized by 'strain and tension.'[11]

2.   The round table and the creation of the British Institute of International Relations

Curtis's attempt 'to embody as much of our Round Table movement as possible in a permanent institution' materialised at a joint conference of British and American members of their delegations at the Paris Peace Conference at the Hotel Majestic on 30 May 1919. It was attended by 37 members of both delegations. The British were represented by 28 members, mainly from the Foreign Office, but also from the War and Colonial Offices, including Robert Cecil, Lord Eustace Percy, Major Harold Temperley, James Headlam-Morley, Philip Baker, Harold Nicolson, Kerr, Curtis, Major Charles K. Webster, Captain Clement Jones, Captain Frank P. Walters, Cecil Hurst, Captain James R. M. Butler, Colonel Frederick Kisch, Edward F. Wise, Alexander W. A. Leeper, Captain Edgar Abraham, Charles Strachey, Sir Robert Garran, Francis B. Bourdillon, Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir Cecil Hurst, Dawson, Geoffrey M. Gathorne-Hardy and Herbert J. Paton.[12]

The American Delegation was represented by nine participants, mostly members of the Inquiry set up in September 1917 by Colonel House. They included Shepardson, Beer, James T. Shotwell, Archibald Cary Coolidge, Thomas Lamont, Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck and Ray Stannard Baker. They agreed to create an Institute 'which would act as a telephone exchange between the few hundred men in each country who administer foreign affairs and create public opinion on the subject.'[13]

The Inquiry had been set up on Wilson's mandate, because of his distrust of his own foreign apparatus – specifically his Secretary of State Robert Lansing; and also because of being 'naturally inclined,' as argued by Williams, 'to the advice of fellow academics,' to prepare materials for the peace negotiations. House's brother-in-law, Sidney Mezes – President of the City College of New York – became its director, Lippmann became its secretary and Isaiah Bowman – director of the American Geographical Society – offered them the facilities of the Society's New York headquarters. Lippmann gathered 126 young talented scholars and business leaders, 'skimming the cream of the younger and more imaginative scholars,' men of 'sheer, startling genius.' With the growth in size and strategic profile of the organisation, Bowman progressively moved from the peripheral position of the host to the central role of the leader, in fact replacing Mezes. The leadership conflict produced, however, Lippmann's resignation before the end of the war.[14]

The peace settlement should be, according to the Inquiry, a 'scientific peace,' a peace 'not predicated on the national power interest of any single government,' but 'based on the disinterested finding of specialists whose work would reflect those principles acceptable to the nations participating in the peace.' The Inquiry widely contributed to the drafting of Wilson's Fourteen Points.[15]

The American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference included 35 Inquiry members. As Chief of the Intelligence Section, Bowman managed to obtain for the Inquiry's delegates prominent positions at the Conference – is some cases above even State Department and Military Intelligence's representatives – producing what become well known as the *Black Book* – 'An Outline of Tentative Recommendations' – soon followed by a *Red Book,* 'feverishly requested it as soon as its existence became known' by other delegations. According to Nielsen, the attitude of the Inquiry 'was unmistakably anti-German and, with few exceptions, enthusiastically pro-British,' producing 'decidedly negative assessments of French, and especially Italian diplomacy.'[16]

In February, the Inquiry was merged by Wilson with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace into the Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, and its members represented the United States within the Conference committees. Being academic researchers, they lacked diplomatic competence, as lamented by Sir James Headlam-Morley, who on 3 February however received confidential 'instructions to have a free interchange of views with the Americans.' Even if 'there was a fundamental community of purpose and interest between the United States and the British Empire,' Tillman observed that 'this basic unity, although often expressed in parallel and even identical policies, it was almost never translated into a common strategy for the attainment of common objectives.' According to Nielson in February 1919, 'no one in the U.S. delegation expected unity or harmony' in Paris, 'except perhaps with the British.'[17]

According to Headlam-Morley, James Shotwell anticipated

> a revival of the distrust with which Great Britain is traditionally regarded and thinks that the pro-German feeling which was strong in large sections of the population before the war will revive … there will be many people in America who will incline to the view that Germany has been purified, but that England has not been. The traditional republican feeling … is very strong and American sympathy will tend to drift towards a republic in Germany.[18]

As soon as the peace terms were made public in May, a sense of disillusionment pervaded both the American and the British delegations. Adolf Berle observed on 15 May that the draft treaty 'abandoned both the letter and spirit' of the American war aims, failing to 'serve either the idealistic or material interests of America, or, indeed, of humanity.' As a consequence, Berle resigned, and was joined by William Bullitt, Joseph Fuller, John Storck, George Bernard Noble, and Samuel Eliot Morison. Bryce – who, even if not a member of the British Delegation, kept in constant contact with it through Kerr – felt that the 'vindictive ferocity' of the draft treaty would produce 'a Peace of Revenge, which will produce a counter-revenge.'[19]

The dissatisfaction among the delegates convened by Curtis and Beer at the Majestic was well expressed by Cecil, who argued that there was 'no single person' in the room who was 'not disappointed' with the terms they had drafted. 'Yet England and America have got all that they want,' Cecil observed, and concluded: 'our disappointment is an excellent symptom: let us perpetuate it.' Curtis and Beer attempted 'making permanent the intellectual bond that had developed between the technical experts' of the Anglo-American delegations, since the future of Anglo-American relations 'would depend upon how far public opinion in these countries would be right or wrong. Right public opinion was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved.'[20]

Informal meetings, initiated by Curtis, and involving Percy, Headlam-Morley, Seton-Watson and Allen Leeper, began in February 1919. In the spring of 1919, Curtis suffered a nervous breakdown and withdrew to Morocco to rest, returning to Paris in May, just in time for the founding meeting at the Majestic. By the end of May, a committee consisting of three American and three British representatives (including Headlam-Morley and Percy) had been formed to prepare a scheme for the Anglo-American institute, based on the philosophy put forward by *The New Europe*, *The New Republic* and *The Round Table*. 'Until recent years,' a report from the Provisional Committee stated,

> it was usual to assume that in foreign affairs each government must think mainly, if not entirely, of the interests of its own people. In founding the League of Nations, the Allied Powers have now recognised that national policies ought to be framed with an eye to the welfare of society at large.

The underlying idea of the proposed Institute was to provide the essential knowledge to the intellectual leadership which had the responsibility for the making of foreign policy.[21]

The very origins of the Institute emerged however out of a dinner for former Balliol students present at the Peace Conference. 'Besides meeting on the Commissions, where the daily work was done,' Headlam-Morley recollected that 'the British and American specialists were constantly dining with one another in their respective hotels.' At the Majestic and Crillon hotels, which hosted respectively the British and American delegations,

> were congregated under one roof trained diplomatists, soldiers, sailors, airmen, civil administrators, jurists, financial and economic experts, captains of industry and spokesmen of labour, members of cabinets and parliaments, journalists and publicists of all sorts and kinds. Many of them came from the various Dominions, India, Egypt or the Crown Colonies. At meals, and when off duty, there was no convention to forbid

discussion of the business in hand. A unique opportunity was thus given to every specialist of grasping the relation of his own particular question to all the others involved, and of seeing its place in the vast problem of reconstruction before the Congress.[22]

The climate at the Majestic's dinners was, according to Shotwell 'the most remarkable I have ever witnessed, and I suppose I shall never see another like it.' On 15 January he recorded:

> At different tables sat the delegations of the different parts of the British Empire. Behind me was Australia, with Premier Hughes … Next to Australia, but separated by a wide strip of carpet, was a large round table for the Indian Empire, with the new Indian Under-Secretary, Sir S.P. Sinha, and the Maharajah of Bikaner, and others. Farther down that side of the room another young Empire was presided over by Sir Robert Borden … Next to the Canadian table was a large dinner party discussing the fate of Arabia and the East with two American guests, General Bliss and George Louis Beer. Between them sat that young successor of Mohammed, Colonel Lawrence, with his boyish face and almost constant smile – the most winning figure, so everyone says, at the whole Peace Conference … At the same table Chirol, the best informed man on European politics, Cecil and Curtis.[23]

Dinners at the Majestic became 'a happy hunting-ground where Curtis would stalk and bag his game.' As soon as Curtis gained the full endorsement of senior members of both delegations – Robert Cecil for the British, and Colonel Edward House, Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss for the American – he diverted to the new venture the enthusiasm and the energies which he had beforehand given to the South African Kindergarten and to the Round Table. 'Only one picture comes back to my mind,' Toynbee acknowledged, recollecting that evening at the Majestic,

> and that very clearly: an evening meeting at the Majestic, with a pretty large number present, but only one man making himself felt. This was of course Lionel Curtis. He held the floor and dominated the proceedings. Before he had done, the Institute was launched, and he marched out of the room with Headlam-Morley firmly grasped under one arm and Lord Robert [Cecil] under the other. Neither of those two eminent men would have taken the initiative or have been able, if he had taken it, to put the thing through. LC is *the* Founder … My forgetting everything about the launching of the Institute except that one scene, with one figure in it, tells a tale.[24]

'Under his own rules, because he had known me as a schoolboy,' Clement Jones, Assistant Secretary to the British Empire Delegation, recalled the Paris 30th May meeting,

> Curtis had a perfect right, in later life, to ask me to do anything he wanted. With him a request was a command and for those of us who 'served under him' it was great fun. There can be few men who ever 'roped in' more friends and casual acquaintances in support of his projects … Chatham House was one of his major round-ups.[25]

Curtis opened the meeting offering the chairmanship to General Bliss, and proposing that a Committee of three Americans and three British be appointed 'to prepare a scheme' for the creation of the Institute to 'be submitted to a meeting of those present' at the evening of the 30 May, plus a number of personalities 'whom the Committee may see fit to add.' Curtis was motivated to make the proposal by the fact that the

peace settlements made in Paris 'were mainly the resultant of the public opinions of various countries concerned,' being public opinions 'often in conflict.' The future 'moulding of those settlements' would depend 'upon how far public opinion in these countries would be right or wrong.' Public opinion was in fact 'mainly produced,' according to Curtis, 'by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved.'[26]

Although it was 'unofficial,' the Institute was intended to be 'strictly of the nature of public service connected with [the] objects of the present Peace Conference.' The Paris Peace Conference had brought together officials and experts who were playing a major role in the process of formation of foreign policy in their own countries. It seemed vital to establish among them an institutional link to continue the work done in Paris, certainly keeping in mind national interests, but also raising the question of the general interest of the world as a whole. Since the creation of such an institution which included all nations appeared unrealistic, Curtis proposed to start with the two leading English-speaking democracies. Having in mind the model of the Royal Geographical Society, Curtis proposed the creation of two central branches on the two sides of the Atlantic, and peripheral branches within each country, producing a year-book or 'Register' of international affairs under joint Anglo-American editorship. Curtis could rely on George Louis Beer and Whitney Shepardson – his former student at Oxford, with whom he had worked closely in Paris – in order to promote the direct involvement of the United States in the post-war settlement. The Anglo-American Institute would be a joint venture 'by the two great commonwealths which had the advantage of a common tongue.'[27]

Curtis's proposal received warm support from all present at the meeting. General Bliss and Cecil gave the meeting political leverage; Sir Eyre Crowe and Cecil Hurst, Beer and James Shotwell brought recognition from senior officials; and Sir James Headlam-Morley added intellectual gravity. The only objections were raised by Crowe, who thought that the proposed Institute would create misunderstandings and tensions with the Foreign Office's staff. Crowe made 'the most interesting speech of the evening,' Curtis wrote to Campbell later in August, 'if only because it was the only one in which any doubts were expressed on the merits of the proposal as a whole.' Crowe represented the traditional attitude of the Foreign Office officer, so much concerned about its monopoly in influencing public opinion, and nervous about the existence of independent moulders of public opinion. Crowe 'disliked and distrusted outsiders (even those from other government departments),' Curtis observed, 'and considered them intruders in a highly skilled craft.' The questions of official secrets, and the difficulty of co-operation among officials, did not however appear to be insoluble. 'The danger of not providing for such intercourse,' Curtis commented, was 'even greater.'[28]

Crowe – who had played a prominent role in building an anti-German attitude within the Foreign Office, directly influencing Grey – had always been an antagonist to the Round Table agenda in general, and in particular to Kerr. As British representative at the Supreme Council in Paris, and Assistant to Lord Hardinge, Permanent Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, Crowe accused Kerr of concealing the recommendations of the Foreign Office from Lloyd George and of hiding those in Lloyd George's communications which were in disagreement with his own views. 'Since when is Mr Ker [sic] Prime Minister?' Crowe questioned in a note during the Paris negotiations, and again, 'I gather that Mr Kerr continues to withhold papers

from the Prime Minister.' Crowe's irritation reached its limit when Lloyd George sent Kerr to Paris during the night of 6–7 December 1918, to prevent Great Britain getting involved in an Allied ultimatum to Germany, which had not fulfilled its obligations, and against which France was calling for military sanctions as required by the Armistice. Crowe, who together with Clemenceau had been the moving force behind the ultimatum, had confined himself to carrying out the instructions of his superiors and therefore interpreted the Prime Minister's counter order – which was nasty and humiliating – as an unreasonable concession to pressure from Kerr. Kerr's mission to Paris had actually been decided by the Government, which sent him on a special train as far as Dover, via a destroyer to Boulogne, and then on a military vehicle from there to Paris. Not finding the vehicle waiting at Boulogne, Kerr reached Paris as best he could.[29]

According to Toynbee, Crowe defended 'a monopoly of the conduct of foreign affairs,' represented by a Foreign Office 'family-circle's historic prerogative.' The Foreign Office in fact was then 'still about zero per cent public relations-minded and one hundred per cent security-minded.' If permanent officers of the Foreign Office were initially banned from being involved in the Institute's activities, they received permission just after its inauguration to become members and to attend meetings, where they were allowed to express their views.[30]

Curtis managed to isolate Crowe's concerns, and at the meeting it was agreed to create a provisional Committee with Curtis and W. H. Shepardson as joint secretaries, and composed of Headlam-Morley, Percy and Lieutenant-Commander J. G. Latham on the British side, and James Brown Scott, Professors Coolidge and Shotwell on the American. It produced reports and resolutions which were submitted to plenary meetings on 9 and 17 June 1919. The Institute should be composed of members of the British and American delegations at Paris, and a limited number of experts of foreign affairs would be co-opted. The subscription fee would not 'exclude anyone otherwise qualified for membership,' and each branch would be independent in producing 'monographs on special subjects.' The Constitution would be drafted by members of each branch.[31]

3.   Towards a new paradigm in Anglo-American relations and the transition to the 'Atlantic system'

The political philosophy put forward by those very active groups of British 'liberal imperialists,' as well as by American Wilsonian intellectuals, financial operators and academics, was based on the assumption that the involvement association of the United States into the direction of world politics would have marked the beginning of a historical process, defined by Kerr as 'the integration of the English-speaking world … a much larger idea' than the Imperial one. If in 1920 Kerr identified in the 'larger idea of a union of self-governing communities' the foundations of the American Federation and the British Empire, in 1927 he believed that this 'much larger idea' had by then entered into 'the realm of practical possibilities.' The dream of Rhodes, to permanently recover to Great Britain the 13 rebel former colonies, was about to become true. From then on Curtis and Kerr played the major role, on the British side, in that recovery.[32]

'Much the most important work that lies in front of the Round Table group or anybody else dealing with world politics,' Kerr observed writing to Curtis in March

1927, 'is to find the positive basis for co-operation between the English-speaking nations.' Again, on 2 September 1927, Kerr wrote to Curtis:

> the English-speaking nations have either got to bring themselves under one sovereignty or they will drift into antagonism. The problem is fundamentally exactly that which confronted you in South Africa after the Boer War and which confronted the thirteen colonies after the Revolutionary War … America … is now by far the richest and most powerful nation in the world. It is being sorely tempted to succumb to the lure of imperialism in bad sense of the word, to buy up the rest of the world, to mobilise the irresistible force in its own hands, and yet to refuse co-operation with other nations or to submit itself to the reign of law. Personally I am convinced that the forces for righteousness are so strong in the United States that when they awake to the question they will bring the United States into line for the world commonwealth.[33]

'The tragedy of the situation' was, according to Curtis, that the 'better understanding between thinkers and workers within the narrow circle of Paris availed so little to affect the main issues' of the peace settlement. Political education was impossible without research, which required access to information. The Paris experience persuaded Curtis that it could be provided by an international gathering of specialists, officials and publicists. The future leadership of international relations depended on the creation of an institutional platform on which they could perpetuate that innovative approach. The South African experience had taught Curtis, according to Lavin, that 'information, research and communication … had been the means by which he and his friends had set out to educate the political public of the four colonies in the idea of closer union.'[34]

'No disasters are quite so terrible and far-reaching,' Kerr pointed out, 'as those brought about by the wrong management of international relations.' Knowledge 'not merely among experts but in the public,' was 'the first condition of their right management.' International relations would improve if in each country there could be established 'a properly equipped institution where men of all ways of thinking who seek to influence public opinion about Foreign Affairs can meet to study their common problems.' Such institutions should be 'in some sort of touch with those founded for the same purpose in other countries.' The British declaration of war on Germany taught 'that the foreign policy of the British Empire cannot be democratic and representative in any adequate degree' unless some means were found 'for continuous consultation and co-operation by Ministers to all the British parliaments.'[35]

This was a view supported in Great Britain by the Union for Democratic Control. The 'most democratically governed country,' should initiate, according to Arthur Ponsonby, 'a great reform in procedure with regard to foreign affairs in the same way as we initiated parliamentary government and representative institutions.' The main aim of the Union for Democratic Control – founded in the first months of the First World War by J. Ramsay MacDonald, Alfred Zimmern, Charles Trevelyan and Norman Angell – was in fact to put an end to 'secret diplomacy,' and secure 'real parliamentary control over foreign policy.'[36]

Attempts 'to enlighten public opinion' would fail unless they had 'their roots in original thought,' and were 'based on continuous enquiry into fact.' The Institute would provide 'a common market of ideas' to experts of international relations, making their studies available to the public at large. Officials should be brought in without limiting their independence or breaching secrecy. Like a university, the

Institute should not depend on public funding, but preserve its independence by generating an endowment fund on the base of individual and corporate subscriptions. The Round Table method of enquiry 'keeping abreast of the facts, discussing the issues in private study groups and publicly communicating the results' became, according to Lavin, 'an acknowledged model' for seminars in Oxford, the research section of the early League of Nations Union, the Next Five Years Group, which Ramsay MacDonald 'later acclaimed as "the Chatham House technique of enquiry",' or what became universally recognised and imitated as the 'Chatham House method'.[37]

As for the South African movement of the closer union societies and the Round Table itself, the Institute had initial financial backing from Bailey, implemented the same method of study groups and had a journal with the objective of influencing the process of formation of Britain's and the Dominions' foreign policy at the highest level. The study groups method derived from the Round Table, and was described by Stephen King-Hall as 'unofficial Royal Commissions' charged with the investigation of specific problems, composed of experts drawn from the academic and business worlds but steered by Curtis and Toynbee, the first Director of studies who was also in charge of a study group on the Near East. Seton-Watson had been appointed to direct a study group on the Balkans. Sir George Prothero helped Curtis to bring the Foreign Press Review of the War Office under the Institute's competence, thus creating the Chatham House press-cutting library.[38]

Percy and Beer were appointed joint editors of the 'Register of International Affairs' and a meeting of members of both delegations held at the Majestic on June 25 discussed Curtis's proposal to ask Temperley to edit a history of the Peace Conference. Contributions would be from Colonel J. M. H. Cornwall, Edwyn Bevan, Ray Stannard Baker, Headlam-Morley, Kerr, Kisch, Wise, Hornbeck, Dudley Ward, Shotwell and Zimmern. Scott and Clement Jones would approach the Dominions' representatives at Paris to become members of the Institute, while Curtis would deal with the British and Americans. Jones guaranteed the involvement of Seton-Watson, Allen Leeper, Felix Frankfurter, Francis B. Bourdillon, Edward H. Carr, Charles Webster and Ivor Thomas.[39]

The British Institute was officially inaugurated on 5 July 1920, at the Astors' London residence in St. James's Square, in the presence of Balfour, Grey and Clynes. The presence of Balfour at the inaugural meeting of the Institute brought Clement Jones to remark that 'the Foreign Secretary himself is playing on our side from the start of the game.'[40]

At the inaugural meeting the former Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey, had urged the new Institute to try to do for the present something like what history does for the past … if year by year it will … produce something like an annual register of foreign affairs, showing what has happened in the previous year, and accompanying it by an explanation or preface, which will not only tell the facts, but show their relation to each other and give us an idea of the value of the respective facts, it will be doing a most important work. It will not interfere with policy, but provide materials from which politicians, statesmen and journalists can form sound opinions in regard to policy.[41]

The Institute should develop, according to Grey, into 'an organisation which will provide the material from which those who are most influential and who have the greatest amount of knowledge, comprehension and perspective in foreign affairs can form public opinion.' He urged the press and politicians to use the services of the

Institute and in so doing 'lay the foundations for sound public opinion.' The formation of élite public opinion, however, could not in fact always be done overtly. Frank discussion, it was pointed out, would be endangered unless concealment of some of the discussions could be assured.[42]

The founding of the Institute was greeted with wide coverage by the 'quality' press. The *Observer* welcomed the Institute as signalling a new era of democratic control of foreign policy, 'the rightful successor to the dynastic and imperialistic policies which have harvested periodic war all down the ages.' The key to such democratic control was, the article suggested, 'popular knowledge' and 'public education.' The *Observer* fully supported the Institute's aims and working methods, which would place interest in foreign affairs 'stirring in an ever-widening circle.' The article concluded with the hope that the Institute would soon 'have proved itself one of the war's most fruitful consequences and a powerful factor in a sound, instructed, and alert public opinion.' A *Times* editorial welcomed the founding of the Institute as 'likely to be a useful educational agency' especially in supporting the League of Nations. In a fairly lengthy leader, the editor warned the new Institute 'to shut out the pushful crank and pedants of a certain aggressive creed, the politician fair and even generous to every country but his own, and the many varieties of Bolshevists, avowed or unavowed.'[43]

Evidently, the exclusion of left-wing opinion within the Institute was definitely resolved from its very establishment. In a separate article covering the inaugural meeting, the *Times* gave considerable space to J. R. Clynes, Labour MP and a founder of the Institute. Speaking in favour of the decision to establish the Institute, Clynes argued that it was particularly important for the education of the labour movement, the leaders of which were becoming progressively aware of foreign affairs. Clynes felt that 'it was indeed strange that the power which presided over the fate of nations should not have called into being an institution such as that proposed many years ago.'[44]

'Institutes are usually composed of men presumably too old ever to know better,' the *Saturday Review* reported, but the British Institute of International Affairs was 'surprisingly low in the average of its years per member.' Its international mix appeared as 'something almost entirely new in politics.' It did not represent 'the old internationalism of the working classes, which aimed at a horizontal division of Europe,' or the internationalism 'of cosmopolitan trade or banking, which regards a frontier as an inconvenience when it does not happen to be an opportunity.' It was rather an internationalism 'which respects frontiers, values the principles of nationality, and seeks to comprehend and sympathise with the various countries of the world in their national aims and activities.'[45]

The Institute would focus on educating the educators, the 'quality' end of the range of public opinion. The Institute would be like a 'common market of ideas of educators and at the same time … the logical training ground for under-secretaries of state.' Curtis further emphasised that 'even the proposed yearbook should not be designed for direct consumption by the public at large.' It should be produced so 'as to concentrate public opinion on the questions which most demand attention at any given time.'[46]

According to Parmar the reasons for the strategic interest of the Institute in the formation of public opinion as an instrument to achieve its aims, were firstly to 'undermine the influence of conservative forces that adhered to autocratic styles of making foreign policy,' and secondly that 'a properly "educated" public opinion would permit the formation and implementation of more "sound" foreign policy,' which

would offset the specific interests of party politics. Finally, Parmar argued that an 'educated' public opinion would contribute to legitimising official foreign policy once implemented. According to Donald C. Watt, Chatham House's definition of public opinion was 'in the Edwardian sense of those close to parliament, the City, the universities, industrial and public affairs.' Parmar included the press and London's gentlemen's clubs.[47]

The Institute received its Royal Charter in 1926. On the other side of the Atlantic attempts to establish a branch were characterised by 'unfruitful zeal,' in Curtis's words. Shepardson in vain tried to involve in the undertaking the Foreign Policy Association – heir of the League to Enforce Peace – until in 1920 he succeeded in setting up, with the assistance of Frances Kellor – Vice-President of the New York-based Inter-Racial Council – 'a sort of Praesidium for that part of the Establishment that guides our destiny as a nation – wealthy East-Coasters like Cravaths, Bowmans, Polks and Dulleses.' Curtis was instrumental in raising grants from the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, which made the creation of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations possible. The Steering Committee included George Wickersham and Hamilton Fish Armstrong – first editor of *Foreign Affairs*, journal of the Council – and the directors Elihu Root, Paul Cravath, Edwin Gray, Isaiah Bowman and Allen Dulles.[48]

The fulfilment of the original 'strategic object' could not have been achieved merely by setting up a London-based centre for the study of and debate on international relations. It required a proper overseas network. If the ultimate goal was the creation of an Anglo-American alliance strong enough to prevent the outbreak of a world war and capable of preparing the conditions for a more stable world order, it was necessary to educate the American and Commonwealth public on its merits. One of Curtis's first duties was, in fact, to reproduce the Round Table network of local groups by founding independent institutes in the capitals of the Commonwealth, while adding New York to the network. The creation of the Dominions branches of the Institute was in fact largely due to Round Table members: in Australia to Eggleston, Sir Thomas Bavin and H. S. Nicholas; in New Zealand to Downie Stewart and A. R. Atkinson, and in South Africa to E. A. Walker.[49]

If Curtis succeeded in establishing the Institute, it was because he managed to bring along most of the Round Table. Curtis's enthusiasm 'dragged his friends at his chariot wheels,' David Watt observed. Lord Meston was the first Chairman of the Institute, Astor was its Chairman for most of the inter-war period, Brand was its first Treasurer, Kerr and Amery were members of the Council. Another Round Table legacy was the use by Curtis of the London offices during the critical early months of the Institute – until Abe Bailey put forward a loan of £200 to cover the initial office expenses – while ransacking the *Round Table* subscription lists in order to build the initial membership of the Institute, producing Dove's irritation at being engulfed in paperwork and at identification of the new Curtis venture as 'your Institute.'[50]

The most significant help to Curtis came from Colonel Reuben Leonard, a Canadian magnate and Curtis's convert to the idea of the Commonwealth, who donated 10 St. James's Square as British headquarters for the nascent Institute. The donation of the magnificent eighteenth-century house, which made the Institute well known to the international public at large as Chatham House, represents the ideal link and heritage of the Institute with the Round Table. The idea had originated from Curtis, who envisaged the creation, in collaboration with the English-Speaking Union, of a

Library in memory of the American Ambassador Walter Page. When this did not materialise, the home of Chatham and Gladstone at 10 St. James's Square was donated to the Institute after the granting of the 'Royal' Charter upon direct intervention by the Duke of Devonshire, Colonial Secretary. This was due to Curtis's pressure, and guaranteed the patronage of the Prince of Wales. With the acquisition of Chatham House, the Institute launched an appeal to underwrite the purchase of books and modern maps and the creation of a press-cutting library.[51]

It is difficult to define the role which Chatham House played within British society at large, and in particular in the foreign policy-making process. If one accepts the thesis put forward by Donald C. Watt – who has been for a long time associated in the post-war years with Chatham House as editor of the annual *Survey of International Affairs* – that Britain is essentially an 'oligocratic society,' one in which 'power is exercised by a minority of its citizens grouped together in a cluster of smaller groups,' it is possible to recognise Chatham House as the institutional locus of one of these groups. According to Watt these groups should be

> consistent enough in their membership over time … to be treated not only as a political but as a social phenomenon, and for the characteristics of their social organisation to be an essential element in the manner in which they perform their political function.

Chatham House's membership varied over time with the varying of the political actors, but so far as the inter-war period is concerned it was consistent with that political and social phenomenon known as 'broad church' liberal imperialism. Curtis's and Kerr's imperialism developed from the racial, during Milner's early influence, to the cultural, an attachment to the fundamental principles which lie at the heart of Anglo-Saxon civilisation, which were seen as exportable, universal and inclusive.[52]

Within the inter-war British foreign policy élite, Chatham House belonged, according to Watt, to one of 'a numerically very limited but strategically important groups of mid-Atlanticist Americophiles.' The founders of the Institute had 'a triple interest in the United States.' Firstly, they were attracted by the American success 'in the absorption and unification of a great mass of different people and traditions,' being a model for a unified British Empire. Secondly, they 'subscribed largely to the theories that the two countries shared a common culture and a common purpose.' Then they saw the United States as partners with whom to establish 'an Anglo-American world hegemony', and 'dominate the world, widening and strengthening the Pax Britannica, the world order on which they set so much store.'[53]

Chatham House's 'political function' was, according to Curtis, 'to apply scientific methods of thought to international problems so far as they can be applied to international data.' According to Toynbee, the nature of the proposed 'centre of authoritative opinion' would be that of a 'private society for the scientific study of international affairs,' producing 'objective, unbiased, unpartisan, un-emotional' information, on which vital political decisions would be taken.[54]

Chatham House had to 'ascertain facts and see them with eyes unclouded by wishful thinking, propaganda and, above all, Government influence,' and the prestige gained by Chatham House internationally as well as nationally was, according to its main architect, 'largely due to the fact that all responsible people in public affairs' recognised that Chatham House worked 'free from all Government influence.' The purposes for which an Institute of International Affairs was needed,' Curtis stated

in the first *Annual Report*, 'are not those of today or tomorrow, but of all time.' Before mankind there was 'a period of reconstruction second in importance not even to the transition accomplished in the first foundation of the Roman Empire.' In a blend of 'idealism and pragmatism in more or less equal proportions' Curtis engaged himself in the most demanding and lasting achievement of his life.[55]

On the record of the early years there is the publication of *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* – made possible by an advance of £2000 by Thomas W. Lamont, Vice-President of the First National Bank, and representing the United States Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference – a number of scholarly monographs, the *Survey,* and the quarterly journal *International Affairs*. The original *Surveys* continued the work done by Headlam-Morley in his regular contributions to the *Round Table* on the 'Problems of Europe.' The *Survey* was financed from 1925 by an endowment of £20,000 from Sir Daniel Stevenson, who also sponsored a research Chair of international history at the University of London, held by Toynbee. The *Survey of British Commonwealth Relations* was financed by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and edited by W. K. Hancock, Chichele Professor of economic history at Oxford. The Institute also hosted a Chair in international economics sponsored by Sir Henry Price with an endowment of £20,000, and held by Allan G. B. Fisher; and the Abe Bailey Professorship in Commonwealth relations filled by Nicholas Mansergh. The Institute also had an official role in the selection of candidates for the Wilson Chair of international politics at the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth, from 1919 to 1939 held by associates of the Round Table: Zimmern, C. K. Webster, Jerome D. Greene and E. H. Carr. The Round Table Group controlled the Chair from its founding by David Davies in 1919, though Davies had severed relations with the Round Table because of disagreements on the League of Nations and European collective security.[56]

Toynbee, Headlam-Morley and Zimmern played the most prominent role, with Curtis, in the creation, development and early history of the Institute. If Toynbee was the first Director, Headlam-Morley served on the Executive Committee of the Institute during the 1920s, and was largely responsible for the appointment of Toynbee as Director of studies. Zimmern was particularly engaged in establishing relationships between the Institute and other organisations and interest groups. Each of them had served in the Department of Political Intelligence in 1918–1919. Other members of the PID who played a role in the Institute were Lewis Namier, Eustace Percy, Rex and Allen Leeper, Edwyn Bevan and George Saunders.

'The influence of Chatham House,' Quigley argued, 'appears in its true perspective, not as the influence of an autonomous body but as merely one of the many instruments in the arsenal of another power.' The power of the Round Table in the fields of education, administration, politics, newspapers and periodicals was, according to Quigley, 'terrifying,' not because it 'was used for evil ends,' but because 'a small number of men' were allowed 'to wield such power in administration and politics,' to obtain an 'almost complete control over the publication of the documents relating to their actions,' to exercise 'such influence over the avenues of information that creates public opinion,' and 'to monopolize so completely the writing and the teaching of the history of their own period.'[57]

Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations played, in fact, a central role in the process of formation of British and American foreign policies in the inter-war period. On the initiative of Curtis, the Round Table achieved 'the strategic object' of the strengthening of Anglo-American relations 'with a necessary tactical

change,' namely with the creation of an Anglo-American 'institutionalized' foreign policy élite. Kerr's and Curtis's masterpiece had been to realise, through Chatham House, Rhodes' dream of the restoration of the First British Empire – or the British Empire before the 'Intolerable Acts' of 1774 – with the progressive inclusion of most of Europe. Milner could not follow his former protégé because it would inevitably have meant the passing of the torch. Milner was too nationalistic, too British-centred, to acquiesce in Great Britain handing over the driving seat to the United States. Milner was, moreover, deeply an anti-democrat. He could not understand – what Kerr, and before him Bryce, understood – the deep meaning of American democracy.[58]

The policy of Atlantic Alliance was not therefore the result of just a temporary convergence of the reasons of state of Great Britain and the United States – as occurred during the First World War, from which followed, once the dust had settled, the return of the United States to isolationism – but the accomplishment of a political project pursued by two organisations specially created at Paris in May 1919, and active since then on both sides of the Atlantic. They succeeded because the project was, in fact, rooted in the Anglo-Saxon political tradition – of which federalism was a component – and because of a 20-year-long process of elaborations, debates and clashes among political organisations active on both shores of the North Atlantic. The Round Table was the most prominent among them, playing a pioneering role, both on the theoretical and organisational profiles. The historical role of the Round Table had been that of theorising, promoting and managing the transition from a British to an American world leadership, playing a decisive role in the survival of Anglo-Saxon world hegemony through the creation of the Atlantic order.

The twentieth appears as a century divided exactly in half. If the first half had been marked by two world wars, which put an end to European hegemony in international politics, its second half was characterised by a long period of truce, during which no regional conflict spread, and directly involved the super-powers. It is plausible then to identify in the signing of the Atlantic Charter, in August 1941, the real watershed of the twentieth century. If it were a simple military-economic agreement – the United States had already openly deployed alongside Britain in the fight against Nazism – it would have been exhausted with the collapse of Germany. If instead it were an alliance to contain the Bolshevik threat, it would have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 1991, the policy of Atlantic union has instead extended to include an increasing number of States, and has been reinforced, including a common army, integrated economic and financial institutions, and a market on the threshold of acquiring common rules. The signing of the Atlantic Charter initiated, around the Anglo-American nucleus, an apparently unstoppable process of economic and political integration among States which over the four previous centuries had permanently resorted to war in order to resolve conflicts among themselves, which the simple means of diplomacy were not able to prevent. It brought about the enlargement of the sphere of influence of the English-speaking countries on world economics and politics alike.

The Atlantic Alliance rather than representing the passing of the torch – whose delay cost Europe and the world two global conflicts – marked the continuity, the enlargement, and the deepening of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in world politics. Such hegemony has since the seventeenth century been able to prevent the unification of Continental Europe by means of violence by the strongest continental power – Spain of Charles V and Philip II, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon I, Germany

of Wilhelm II and Hitler, and Russia of Stalin and Brezhnev. It encouraged, on the contrary, Europe's economic and political unification through peaceful and constitutional means with the building of supranational institutions.[59]

According to this perspective, we did not have therefore a 'British century' – the nineteenth – and an 'American century' – the twentieth – but four centuries of Anglo-Saxon naval supremacy, key to world power and therefore global hegemony. During this time we witnessed the affirmation of the national principle – an expression of the Continental political tradition – and its overcoming through its opposite, the federal principle, an expression of the insular political tradition.[60]

Conclusion

The Round Table was the first political movement which had full awareness that the Great War had opened up a supranational phase in human history, and that this historical novelty was governable with the instruments of democracy, but only through the gradual transfer of portions of sovereignty from the old nation-states to a new supranational institution. The English-speaking peoples could lead that process – thus creating the first nucleus of aggregation – because they invented the federal government and were the first to experience its application, and because they shared the same fundamental moral, political and economic values. Through the creation of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations the Round Table significantly contributed to the formation of a transatlantic foreign policy élite which shaped the post-Second World War world order, strongly anchored on the world-wide Anglo-Saxon hegemony. The creation of the European Union and of the Atlantic community could rightly be regarded as first concrete achievements of the Round Table's vision and efforts.

Notes

1. Aware that the Great War had been an unnecessary carnage, in which he lost his brother David, Kerr – become in the meantime Lord Lothian – made of his desperate attempt to prevent the Second World War a personal matter, bringing into play all the extraordinary fire-power accumulated meanwhile by the movement. In the implementation of a policy diametrically opposed to that of Milner, appeasement, Lothian actually contributed to the establishment of Hitler's supremacy in Central and Eastern Europe, exactly what Milner and the Liberal League had denied to the King's cousin. It is interesting to note how the architects of these diametrically opposed policies towards Germany belonged to the same organization, and how those policies were in any case unable to prevent the outbreak of two world wars. Indeed, they accelerated the drift towards the catastrophe. At different historical moments, but in the same context, the Round Table had strong ideological reasons for adopting opposite policies, which were the major causes of two world wars. If Milner failed, Lothian at the end succeeded, using Germany for other purposes. For a discussion, see Andrea Bosco, *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the 'Second' British Empire, 1909–1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 376–83. On Curtis, see: Deborah Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and Indian Dyarchy', in *The Federal Idea. The History of Federalism from the Enlightenment to 1945,* ed. Andrea Bosco (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991); Deborah Lavin, *From Empire to Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Deborah Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and the Founding of Chatham House', in *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy 1919–1945. The Royal Institute of International Affairs During the Inter-War Years*, eds. Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); Andrea Bosco, ed., *Two Musketeers for the Empire. The Lionel Curtis-Philip Kerr Correspondence, 1909–1940* (London: Lothian

Foundation Press, 1997). On Lothian, see: James Ramsay Butler, *Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), 1882–1940* (London, 1960); John Turner, *Lloyd George's Secretariat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); David Reynolds, 'Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939–1940', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, 73, Part 2, (1983); John Turner, ed., *The Larger Idea. Lord Lothian and the Problem of National Sovereignty* (London: The Historians' Press, 1988); Stefan Schieren, *Von Weltreich zum Weltstaat. Philip Kerrs/Lord Lothian Weg vom Imperialisten zum Internationalisten, 1905–1925* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); Andrea Bosco, ed., *Adviser to the Prince. The Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian) – David Lloyd George Correspondence 1917–1940* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1997); David Billington Jr., *Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest for World Order* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Priscilla Roberts, *Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1900–1940* (Danvers, MA: Dordrecht, 2010); Andrea Bosco, *Lord Lothian and the Creation of the Atlantic Policy* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 2012).

2. For a discussion, see Bosco, *The Round Table*, 384–432.

3. The Soviet Union undoubtedly played a major role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. However, when one considers the possession and possible use of the atomic bomb by the United States against Germany, it is plausible to hypothesize the self-sufficiency by the Anglo-Saxon powers in defeating Germany by late July or early August 1945. As reported by General Leslie Groves – responsible with J. Robert Oppenheimer for the Manhattan Project – just before the Yalta Conference President Roosevelt contemplated the possibility to drop the atomic bomb on Germany – if they had the bomb ready – before the European war was over, Leslie Groves, *Now It Can Be Told* (New York: Harper, 1962), 184.

4. Priscilla Roberts, 'Willard D. Straight and the Diplomacy of International Finance During the First World War', *Business History* 40, no. 3 (July 1998): 16–47; Lippmann to Graham Wallas, 21 April 1916, quoted in John Martin Blum, ed., *Public Philosopher: Selected Letters of Walter Lippmann* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1984), 46; Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1980), 67–73.

5. Roberts, *Lord Lothian and Anglo-American*, 33–4. On the East Coast attitude in the United States towards immigrants, see Desmond King, *Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). On Roosevelt's entourage, see Richard H. Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985); Kenton J. Clymer, *John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975); William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Richard W. Leopold, *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1954); Godfrey Hodgson, *The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867–1950* (New York: Knopf, 1990); Willaim N. Tilchin, *Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997).

6. For a debate, see: Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Nicholas J. Cull, 'Selling Peace: The Origins, Promotion and Fate of the Anglo-American New Order During World War II', *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 7, no. 1 (March 1996): 1–15; Priscilla Roberts, 'The Anglo-American Theme: American Visions of an Atlantic Alliance, 1914–1933', *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (1997): 333–64; Ross A. Kennedy, *The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America Strategy for Peace and Security* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2009).

7. Lord Lothian, *Pacifism is not enough, nor Patriotism either. Collected Lectures and Speeches by Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr)*, ed. Andrea Bosco and John Pinder (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1990), 255–6.

8. Sir J. W. Barrett to Curtis, 23 February 1920, Lothian Papers (hereafter LP), 495, National Archives, Edinburgh; H. F. von Haast to Curtis, 8 March 1920, Brand Papers (hereafter BP), 42, Bodleian Library, Oxford; Malcolm to Coupland, 22 February 1919, Round Table Papers (hereafter RTP), Bodleian Library, Oxford, c 814, 155–6; Coupland to Dove, 28 February 1923, RTP, c 804, 197.

9. John Kendle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 261–2.

10. Curtis to Lothian, 6 December 1936, (quoted in Bosco, *Two Musketeers for the Empire*, 150–1). Circular to the Dominion groups, 22 December 1920, LP, 17, 16–29. The coverage given by the Round Table to international over Imperial questions increased from 17.8% to 31.5% from 1918 to 1939 (May, *The Round Table*, 218).

11. B. J. C. Kercher, '"The Deep and Latent Distrust": The British Official Mind and the United States, 1919–1929', in *Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy*, ed. B. J. C. Kercher (London, 1991), 1.

12. Curtis to Hichens, Dawson, Brand and Lothian, 6 August 1930, LP, 252, 627–32. Lord Eustace Percy was British representative from the Foreign Office on the League of Nations Commission, 1919, Conservative MP, 1921–1937, Minister of Health, 1923–1924, President of the Board of Education, 1924–1929, Minister without Portfolio, 1935–1936, Author. Major Harold Temperley was Member of British Military Section, Paris, 1919, editor of *A History of the Paris Peace Conference*, vol. 6. (London, 1920–1924). James Headlam-Morley was Foreign Office adviser (Political Section) at Paris, 1919, and diplomatic historian. Philip Baker was Foreign Office adviser and Head (under Cecil) of the League of Nations Section at Paris in 1919, Labour MP 1929–1931, and 1936–1970, British delegate to the League Assembly, 1929–1931, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1947, and Professor of International Relations at University of London, 1924–1929. Harold Nicolson was Foreign Office adviser at the Political Section, National Labour MP, 1935–1945, and historian. Major Charles Kingsley Webster was Secretary to the Military Section of the Foreign Office and diplomatic historian. Captain Clement Jones was Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, 1916–1920, and Secretary of the British Empire Delegation at Paris. Captain Frank Walters was Private Secretary to Lord Robert Cecil, 1919, senior officer of the League of Nations Secretariat, and author of *A History of the League of Nations* (London, 1952). Cecil Hurst was Foreign Office League Adviser, 1916–1929, Secretary of the Legal Section of the Foreign Office in Paris, and judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1929–1946. Captain James R. M. Butler was a Member of the Military Section of the Foreign Office, fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Regius Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, 1947–1954, chief historian for Official Military Histories, 1939–1945, and author of the 'official' Lothian biography. Colonel Frederick Kisch was a Member of the Military Section of the Foreign Office in Paris. Edward Frank Wise was an economist, and in Paris was Ministry of Food Adviser. Alexander W. A. Leeper was Special Adviser to the Foreign Office Political Section, and Head of League of Nations and Western Department of the Foreign Office, 1933–1935. Captain Edgard Abraham was an Indian Civil Servant, and British Secretary to the Council of Ten at Paris. Charles Strachey was Colonial Office representative at Paris. Sir Robert Garran was Solicitor General of Australia and member of the British Delegation at Paris. Francis Bernard Bourdillon was a member of Admiralty Intelligence Department, 1916–1919, and Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1926–1929. Herbert James Paton was member of Admiralty Intelligence Department, 1918–1919, adviser to the Political Section of the Foreign Office on Polish affairs, and Professor of logic at Glasgow University and of moral philosophy at Oxford.

13. George Beer was a businessman and historian of the British colonial system in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, a member of Wilson's Inquiry 1917–1919, and of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. James T. Shotwell was a historian at Columbia University, a member of the Inquiry and of the American Delegation in Paris. Archibald Cary Coolidge was Professor of Eastern European History at Harvard University, a member of the Inquiry, and of the American Delegation. Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck was Professor of Political Science at Wisconsin University, a member of the United States Tariff Commission, 1917–1918, a member of the Inquiry and of the American Delegation, and head of the State Department's Far Eastern Division. Ray S. Baker was Director of President Wilson's Press Bureau at Paris, and editor of Wilson's private papers. 'George Louis Beer,' *The Round Table* (September 1920), 935.

14. Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. 3 (London: Benn, 1926), 169; Seth Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 17–18; Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 119, 127; Andrew Williams, *Failed Imagination? The Anglo-American New World Order from Wilson to Bush* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 37; Jonathan Nielson, 'The Scholar as Diplomat: American Historians at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919', *The International History Review* 14, no. 4 (1992), 232.

15. Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 26; Smith, *American Empire*, 118–20; Lawrence Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919* (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976), 16; Andrew Williams, *Failed Imagination?* 38–39.

16. Gelfand, *The Inquiry*, 168–69, 183; Nielson, 'The Scholar as Diplomat', 243. If among the officials of the American Delegation there was suspicion about the role that the Inquiry's members would have at the Conference, the 23 members who travelled to Paris with the rest of the American Delegation felt frustrated and resented the poor accommodations offered to them aboard the *USS Washington*, which landed at Brest on 14 December 1918, (Smith, *American Empire*, 145); Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power*, 225; Gelfand, *The Inquiry*, 169–76; Smith, *American Empire,* 146–8. If the *Black Book* dealt with territorial and labour matters, the *Red Book* regarded colonial issues, (Nielson, 'The Scholar as Diplomat', 237–38, 250). According to Gelfand the *Black* and *Red Book* 'will remain for the historian the central statement of the work of the Inquiry and its contribution to the Peace Treaty,' Gelfand, *The Inquiry*, 182. For an assessment of the Inquiry, see Ibid., 235–38, 265–67, 322–25.

17. Nielson, 'The Scholar as Diplomat', 237, 240; James Headlam-Morley, *Sir James Headlam-Morley: A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, eds. Agnes Headlam-Morley et al. (London: Butler & Tanner, 1972), 8, 18; John D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm* (Lanham, MD: University of Delaware Press, 1992), 148; Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, 401. Headlam-Morley's association with Kerr allowed him to put the case for the protection of minorities in front of the inner circle which drafted the Treaty, (Alan Sharp, 'Sir James Headlam-Morely as Historical Advisor' (paper presented to the International History Conference on Historians and Officials, London School of Economics, 28–30 June 1993.)

18. Headlam-Morley, *Sir James Headlam-Morley*, 38–39.

19. Adolf Berle, *Navigating the Rapids, 1918–1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 12–3.

20. According to Shotwell 'it was chiefly Curtis himself and the American correspondent of *The Round Table,* the historian George Louis Beer, who conceived' this idea. Even if Shotwell mentioned that this meeting included Germans, there is no evidence from other eyewitnesses of this, even if the Institut für Auswärtige Politik was in fact created in Hamburg in 1923 as a sister-institute to the British Institute of International Affairs. James T. Shotwell, 'Address Before the International Conference of Institutes of World Affairs', 20 October 1953, RTP, 853.152; Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London: Methuen, 1964), 352–3; Headlam-Morley, *Sir James Headlam-Morley*, 132; Arnold Toynbee, *Experiences* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 60–62; Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power*, 27–8; Fair, *Harold Temperley*, 148.

21. Chatham House Papers (hereafter CHP), Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Report of the Provisional Committee appointed to prepare a Constitution, and select the original members of the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs, n.d., 1; Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, 260–63.

22. Michael L. Dockrill, 'The Foreign Office and the "Proposed Institute of International Affairs" 1919', *International Affairs* 61 (1980): 665–72. CHP, 'Report of the Provisional Committee Appointed to Prepare a Constitution, and Select the Original Members of the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs,' CHP, HDLM Acc 727, 43.

23. James Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1937), 121–2.

24. Clement Jones, Diary, 17 June 1919 (quoted in Lavin, *From Empire to*, 167); Arnold Toynbee, 'Early Days of Chatham House', 10, CHP, 2/1/2A.

25. Clement Jones, 'The Origins of Chatham House', Chatham House 2/1/2, RTP, c. 869. Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, 1916–1921, Head of Foreign Office League of Nations section, 1918–1919, and Leader of the British Delegation on the League of Nations Commission, Paris, 1919, Lord Privy Seal, 1923–1924, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (with special responsibility for League of Nations affairs), 1924–1927, President of the League of Nations Union, 1923–1945. Colonel Edward House, Special Adviser to President Wilson at Paris. Henry White, American diplomat and American plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference, 1918–1919. General Tasker H. Bliss, former United States Army Chief of Staff and United States plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

26. Minute by Curtis, 21 June 1919, Foreign Office Papers (hereafter FOP), National Archives, Kew, FO 608/152; 'Peace Congress. Political, General' 502/4/1; Minutes of Meeting at Hotel Majestic May 30, 1919, FOP, FO 608/152. General Tasker Bliss had read Curtis's article 'Window of Freedom', and regarded him 'the most intelligent man and evidently deeply informed on world affairs of great importance,' (quoted in Lavin, *From Empire to*, 162). On 22 Dec. 1918 Beer introduced Curtis to Bliss, who was so involved in the conversation as to miss President Wilson's honorary degree ceremony at the Sorbonne (Ibid.).

27. Ibid.; W. R. Louis, 'The United States and the African Peace Settlement of 1919: The Pilgrimage of George Louis Beer', *Journal of African History* 4, no. 3 (1963): 71–2; 'Minutes of Meeting at Hotel Majestic,' 30 May 1919, FOP, FO 608/152; D. J. Markwell, "Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On," *Review of International Studies*, 12, (1986): 80.

28. CHP, 2/1/2; Lionel Curtis, 'Record of interview with Sir Austen Chamberlain on 18 June 1929', CHP, 4/BAIL; Report of the British Members of the Joint Committee on the selection of original members of the Institute of International Affairs, CHP, 2/1/2; Minutes of the Provisional Committee, 18 June, Ibid.; Curtis to R. H. Campbell, Foreign Office, 20 August 1919, FOP, FO 608/152. On the Foreign Office attitude, see Zara S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1891–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 139–40; Minute of Meeting relative to proposed Institute, May 30, 1919, FOP, FO 608/152; Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir*, 132.

29. Michael Dockrill and Zara Steiner, 'The Foreign Office at the Paris Peace Conference', *International History Review* 2, no. 1 (January 1980): 54–82; LP, 1183. For Crowe's role at the Peace Conference, see Edward Corp, 'Sir Eyre Crowe and Georges Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919–20', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 1 (March 1977): 10–9.

30. Toynbee, *Experiences*, 63–5.

31. Lionel Curtis, 'Report of the British members of the Joint Committee appointed May 30', FOP, FO 608/152; 'Report of the Committee Appointed by an Informal Meeting of Persons Attached to the British and American Peace Delegations at the Hotel Majestic, on May 30, 1919', Ibid.

32. Kerr to E. Lascelles, 24 December 1920, LP, 214, 124–26; Kerr to Curtis, 26 May 1927, LP, 227, 155–8. On the Rhodes Trust, see Frank Aydelotte, *The Vision of Cecil Rhodes* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946); Thomas J. Schaeper and Kathleen Schaeper, *Rhodes Scholars, Oxford, and the Creation of an American Elite* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998).

33. LP, 227.

34. Lionel Curtis, 'Report of the Provisional Committee appointed to prepare a Constitution, and select the original members of the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs', CHP, Chatham House 2/1/2. F. Whyte, 'The British Institute of International Affairs', *The New Europe* (July 1920): 308–9; Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and the Founding of Chatham House', 62.

35. Kerr to Robert Cecil, 23 November 1919, LP, 207; Philip Kerr, 'The British Empire, the League of Nations, and the United States', *The Round Table* (March 1920): 248.

36. Arthur Ponsonby, *Democracy and Diplomacy. A Plea for Popular Control of Foreign Policy* (London, 1915), 6. Educated at Eton and Oxford, the 1st Baron Arthur Ponsonby was Private Secretary of Campbell-Bannerman (1905–1908), Liberal MP for Stirling (1908–1918), and Labour MP for Brightside (1922–1930). From 1929 to 1931, he was a junior minister, and in 1931 became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Michael Bentley, *The Liberal Mind 1914–1929* (Cambridge, 1977), 167; Phillip Darby, *Three Faces of*

Imperialism. British and American Approaches to Asia and Africa (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 102; Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire. British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895–1914* (London, 1968), 221. In *The Political Conditions of Allied Success: A Plea for a Protective Union of the Democracies*, Norman Angell advocated in 1918 the continuation after the war of co-operation among the democracies in creating common institutions for the strengthening of the Atlantic community, through a process of democratization which would associate public opinion in the foreign policy decision-making process, Norman Angell, *The Political Conditions of Allied Success: A Plea for a Protective Union of the Democracies* (New York, 1918). For a discussion on Angell and Liberal internationalists, see Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition* (Farnham: Ashgate, 1999).

37. Memorandum by Lionel Curtis and Whitney H. Shepardson, CHP, Chatham House 2/1/2; Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and the Founding of Chatham House', 62–3.

38. Stephen King-Hall, *Chatham House: A Brief Account of the Origins, Purposes and Methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 67.

39. Curtis to Major Webster and 19 others, June 20, 1919, FOP, FO 608/152; Michael Palairet to Campbell, 16 August 1919, FO 608/152; Wilfred Knapp, 'Fifty Years of Chatham House Books', *International Affairs* (Nov. 1970): 139–40; Clement Jones, Diary, 17 June 1919 (quoted in Lavin, *From Empire to*, 167); Harold W. V. Temperely, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. 6 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920–1924). Robert Vansittart, was Adviser to the Political Section at Paris, Permanent Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1930–1938, and Chief Diplomatic Adviser, 1938–1941. FO 608/152. Colonel J. M. H. Cornwall was in Paris as a member of the Directorate of Military Intelligence of the War Office. Edwyn Bevan was a member of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918–1921, and lecturer in Hellenistic history and literature at King's College, London, 1922–1933. Dudley Ward was Treasury Officer, and member of the Financial Section of the British Delegation at Paris.

40. Quoted in Paul Williams, 'A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919–1939', *International Relations* 17 (2003): 41.

41. Quoted in *Survey of International Affairs*, Research Committee, 7 June 1955, Appendix B/1, CHP, section 2/1/1e.

42. *The British Institute of International Affairs* (London, 1920), 12–4.

43. *Observer* (4 July 1920), 12; *The Times* (5 July 1920), 15.

44. *The Times* (6 July 1920), 16. Clynes was an MP 1906–1931, and 1935–1945; Home Secretary, 1929–1931; and one time President of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers.

45. *Saturday Review*, 10 July 1920.

46. Memorandum by Lionel Curtis and Whitney Shepardson, CHA 2/1/2, 2, 11, 13.

47. Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power*, 166; Donald C. Watt, Foreword to *Chatham House*, Bosco and Navari; Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power*, 167.

48. Lionel Curtis, 'America and the Institute of International Affairs', CHP, 4/CURT; 'The American Institute', BP, 39; Whitney Shepardson, *Early History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (Stamford, CT: Overbrook Press, 1960); Foster, *High Hopes*, 56–7; R. H. Rovere, *The American Establishment and other Reports, Opinions and Speculations* (London, 1963), 238. On the role of Armstrong in the creation of the Council on Foreign Relations, see Priscilla Roberts, '"The Council Has Been Your Creation," Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Paradigm of the American Foreign Policy Establishment', *Journal of American Studies* 35, no. 1 (April 2001): 65–94.

49. Lavin, *From Empire to*, 168.

50. Watt, 'The Foundations of', 431; Lavin, *From Empire to*, 168.

51. Curtis to Leonard, 21 June 1923, CHP, 4/LEON; Curtis to Leonard 19 July, 26 July, 13 August, 15 August 1923, Ibid.; Curtis to Shepardson, 3 January 1924, RTP, c. 872; Kenneth Younger, 'The Study and Understanding of International Affairs', *International Affairs* (November 1970): 150–64.

52. Donald Cameron Watt, *Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1965), 1. For a discussion on the legacy of European imperialism, see: Saul Dubow, *The Rise and Fall of Modern Empires:*

Colonial Knowledges (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). According to Curtis it was problematic to discern 'qualities inherent in the English which distinguish them above their neighbours on the Continent,' and 'it is impossible to establish any theory of racial superiority.' Therefore, 'English success in planting North America … must, in fact, be traced to the respective merits not of breed but of institutions,' CP, 156/9, 207.

53. Donald Cameron Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place 1900–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 49; Donald Cameron Watt, *Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1965), 30.
54. Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and the Founding', 62; Toynbee, *Experiences*, 61; Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 353.
55. *First Annual Report*, British Institute of International Affairs (London, 1920); Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and the Founding', 62.
56. Zimmern was the first chairholder (1919–21). Sir Charles Kingsley Webster (1886–1961), Professor of Modern History at Liverpool University, 1914–1922; General Staff of the War Office, 1917–1918; Secretary, Military Section, British Delegation to the Conference of Paris, 1918–1919; Wilson Professor of International Politics, University of Wales, 1922–1932; Professor of History, Harvard University, 1928–1932; Stevenson Professor of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1932–1953; Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939–1941; Director, British School of Information (New York), 1941–1942; Member of British Delegation, Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, 1944–1945; Member, Preparatory Commission and General Assembly, United Nations, 1945–1946; President of the British Academy, 1950–1954 and Foreign Secretary, 1955–1958. While Professor of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth he wrote his two major books on the foreign policy of Lord Castlereagh. Jerome Davis Greene (1874–1959) was an American banker and was involved in several organizations and trusts including Lee, Higginson and Co.; Secretary of the Corporation of Harvard University, 1905–1910, and 1934–1943; Joint Secretary of the Reparations Committee at the Paris Peace Conference; Secretary and Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1913–17, and in 1928–1939; Chairman of the Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1929–32; Trustee of the Brookings Institution of Washington, DC, 1928–1945. He was one of the early figures in the establishment of the Council on Foreign Relations, and obtained the professorship at Aberystwyth, 1932–1934, through Curtis's intervention. Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) was educated at the Merchant Taylors' School, London and at Trinity College, Cambridge. Carr began his career as a diplomat in 1916, and participated in the Paris Peace Conference as a member of the British Delegation. He resigned from the Foreign Office in 1936 to begin an academic career. From 1941 to 1946, Carr worked as an assistant editor at *The Times*. In 1936, Carr became the Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, using his position to criticize the League of Nations, which caused much tension with Lord Davies, who had established the Wilson Chair in 1919 with the intention of increasing public support for the League. This was a position which he kept until 1947, when he was forced to resign. On Davies, see Brian Porter, 'David Davies and the Enforcement of Peace', *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed*, eds. David Long and Peter Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 58–78.
57. Carrol Quigley, *The Anglo-American Establishment* (San Pedro, CA: GSG, 1981), 197.
58. On the creation of an Anglo-American Establishment, see Priscilla Roberts, 'The American "Eastern Establishment" and World War I: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy tradition', vol. 2. (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 1981); Donald C. Watt, 'America and British Foreign Policy-making Elite, 1895–1956', *Personalities and Policies* (London, 1965), 19–52; H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American relations, 1783–1952* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1954). An example of the ideological and strategic continuity between the British Empire and the 'Atlantic system' is offered by the fact that the Americans played, towards the process of European unification, exactly the same role as played by the British towards the process of Canadian unification, being aware that Canada would become, once united, their crux. The United States promoted European unification because that was the only way to prevent West Germany – and after her, Italy and

246 A. Bosco

France – from falling under the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Great Britain acted in the same way in order to prevent Canadian provinces from falling under the United States' sphere of influence. Not by chance the Canadian Federation was established two years after the conclusion of the American War of Secession. Another example, on the economic and financial spheres, is offered by Kennedy's attempt – renewed by the present American Administration, and the object of current negotiations – to establish with the European partners a 'more perfect union', with the creation of a transatlantic commercial community. In this attempt to establish the largest 'single' market in the world could be seen – depending on the final conditions – a renewal of the fateful protectionist Ottawa agreements of 1932, which represented not only the posthumous and ephemeral victory of Milner over Lothian, but also a tremendous boost to the rise of Hitler to power. The fundamental difference compared with 1932 is that the European Union today has a single currency, which is not the dollar, and quasi-federal institutions, while in 1932 the Dominions were marching in random order. In the same way as Canada – unified under British leadership – represented an insurmountable obstacle to the transformation of the British Empire into a federation, so the European Union – established under American leadership – could represent an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of the Kennedian project – the young Kennedy had been an admirer of Lothian, and met him in Washington – of a 'more perfect union' between the two shores of the North Atlantic. Already there exists a common – not yet single – army under American leadership, just as for instance the leadership of the army and the navy in the British Empire had always strictly been under British control. Once the parity between the two currencies was fixed, it would be possible to create a single currency as well. The fact that these goals are reachable in the near future is demonstrated by the present activism of Russia's foreign policy, since she would be fatally excluded from the Atlantic block, isolated, and further weakened by the inevitable loss of pieces of her former Empire (Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, so forth), which would inexorably be attracted within the Euro-American orbit.

59. Erich Marcks predicted in the early 1920s that the outcome of WWI would bring about 'Anglo-Saxon world domination', since counterweights were 'hardly discernible'. An Anglo-American convergence of interests would have also produced appeasement towards Germany, Erich Marcks, *Englands Machtpolitik. Vorträge und Studien* (Berlin, 1940), 182.

60. Moving from a completely different perspective, Walter Russell Mead discusses in *God and God. Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008) the process of transition from a British to an American Empire. The study of the Round Table brings, on the contrary, evidence of a 'resurrection', in the present 'Atlantic system', of the 'First' British Empire, or the Empire as such before the 'Intolerable Acts' of 1774.

Notes on contributor

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